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ATTORNEY'S FEE CONTINGENCY ENHANCEMENTS:
TOWARD A COMPLETE INCENTIVE TO LITIGATE UNDER
FEDERAL FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES-Pennsylvania v. Dela-
ware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987)
Federal fee-shifting statutes1 generally allow trial courts to award
"reasonable" attorney's fees to prevailing parties in order to promote
private enforcement of Congressional statutory directives. The start-
ing point for the computation of fee awards under the fee-shifting stat-
utes is the "lodestar" amount. The "lodestar" amount is defined as
the reasonable number of hours spent by the attorney on the case mul-
tiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Trial courts, in their discretion,
have then enhanced the lodestar amount based on a variety of factors,
including the quality of representation, delay in receiving payment,
and contingency. Contingency is defined as the risk at the outset of
the litigation that the prevailing attorney will receive no fee.
The inconsistent application of contingency enhancements by the
federal courts led the Supreme Court to consider the allowance of such
enhancements in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for
Clean Air II2 In a five-to-four plurality decision, the Court reversed
an award of a contingency enhancement to a lodestar fee. A different
majority of five Justices concluded that Congress did not intend to
foreclose the allowance of such enhancements in enacting fee-shifting
statutes. Although these five Justices agreed on a "market" theory of
compensating for contingency, they did not adopt a specific method of
computing contingency enhancements.
This Note discusses how lower courts can apply the opinions in Del-
aware Valley 11 to allow contingency enhancements to lodestar fees
consistent with Congress' intent in enacting fee-shifting statutes.
Because lower courts may interpret Delaware Valley II as effectively
eliminating contingency enhancements in all but exceptional cases,
this Note suggests that Congress should amend the fee-shifting stat-
utes to allow such enhancements.
1. There are currently over 100 federal fee-shifting statutes. For a list of such statutes, see
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 44-51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987) ("Delaware Valley IF'). The decision in Delaware Valley 11 resulted
from the Court's request in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 106
S. Ct. 3088 (1986) ("Delaware Valley P'), for the parties to reargue the issue of whether
contingency enhancements are allowed under federal fee-shifting statutes. See infra text
accompanying note 53.
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I. COMPUTATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDS
A. The Purposes of Fee-Shifting Statutes
Governmental enforcement of some federal laws is sometimes insuf-
ficient to carry out Congress' objectives.3 The major purpose of fee-
shifting statutes is to provide an incentive for the private enforcement
of Congressional statutory policy. 4 The statutory award of attorney's
fees allows parties bringing actions to act both on their own behalf and
on the public's behalf in promoting Congressional policy.5 However,
private enforcement of statutes is unlikely if aggrieved citizens lack
financial resources to pay lawyers for their services.6 Fee awards are
an integral part of the remedies available to ensure compliance with
various Congressional statutes.7
3. This situation arises for at least three reasons. First, even when an agency of the
government has enforcement responsibility, its authority and resources may be limited. HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976, H.R.
REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1. Second, in many cases where laws are violated, private
citizens must initiate court action to correct the violation of the law. Id. Third, many
government agencies are the defendants in suits enforcing the statutory rights, so they "may
follow a restrictive approach to public interest cases." R. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE
ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION AND REVIEW 128 (1980).
4. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARDS ACT, S.
REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5908, 5910 ("fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a
meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which [civil rights]
laws contain").
This Note makes frequent reference to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), and the Committee reports thereunder. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra;
H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 3. The Supreme Court has applied the legislative history and
case law governing 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in interpreting the provisions of other fee-shifting statutes,
including the Clean Air Act attorney's fee provision involved in Delaware Valley Il. Delaware
Valley II, 107 S. Ct. at 3080 n.l. Therefore, the Supreme Court's holdings on the computation of
attorney's fee awards have been interpreted to apply to fee-shifting statutes in general. See Blum
v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 379 n.10 (3d Cir. 1987); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380,
1404 n.22 (4th Cir. 1987).
5. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 4, at 3.
6. Id. at 2. In addition, contingent fee arrangements are not useful when the only available
relief is an injunction or declaratory judgment. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S.
400, 402 (1968), quoted in S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 4, at 3.
7. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 4, at 5. The fee-shifting statutes also serve other purposes.
Equity and fairness are achieved because the cost of enforcement is charged to the violators of
the statutory rights rather than the persons seeking to preserve their rights. Rowe, The Legal
Theory ofAttorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651. 653-57; R. ARONSON,
supra note 3, at 128. An award of attorney's fees has the effect of making the litigant "financially
whole," Rowe, supra, at 653, 657-59, and the judicial system is benefitted by assuring greater
equality in the adversary process. R. ARONSON, supra note 3, at 128. Fee-shifting statutes
provide a method of financing public interest law which enables a lawyer to represent individual
clients rather than a "source of funds." Id. at 129. Finally, some fee-shifting statutes are
intended to discourage unwarranted litigation by punishing abuses of the judicial process. M.
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B. Approaches to Computation of Attorney's Fee Awards
Under most fee-shifting statutes, an award of attorney's fees must be
"reasonable." ' A reasonable attorney's fee is one that is "adequate to
attract competent counsel, but which do[es] not produce windfalls to
attorneys."9 Three approaches have been used by the courts to com-
pute awards under the fee-shifting statutes.
1. The "'Lodestar" Approach
The "lodestar" method is a market-focused, objective approach to
computing fee awards under fee-shifting statutes. Under this method,
the court determines the basic amount of the attorney's fee award by
multiplying the reasonable number of hours worked on the litigation
by the reasonable market-based hourly rates for such work."° After its
creation by the Third Circuit in 1973,11 the lodestar approach has
become almost universally used as the starting point by courts in com-
puting a reasonable attorney's fee award.12
.2. The "Subjective Factors" Approach
Courts using subjective criteria in computing the amount of attor-
ney's fee awards weigh several factors in computing a reasonable fee
award. The most commonly employed set of subjective factors is con-
tained in the Fifth Circuit's 1974 decision, Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc. 3 The application by a trial judge of this list of often
overlapping subjective factors in computing attorney's fee awards has
been criticized for producing divergent, unpredictable and ufijust
DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES 15.02[1] (1986); Rowe, supra, at
660-61.
8. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ("the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party...
a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."); Clean Air Act § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d)
("The court... may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness
fees) to any party...").
9. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 4, at 6.
10. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
11. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Lindy P'), vacated, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976).
12. M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 7, at 15.0312], [4].
13. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The factors cited in Johnson are the time and labor
required; the novelty and difficulty of the questions; the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly; the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; the
customary fee; whether the fee is fixed or contingent; time limitations imposed by the client or
the circumstances; the amount involved and the results obtained; the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorneys; the "undesirability" of the case; the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and awards in similar cases. Id. at 717-19.
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awards,' 4 being unwieldy to apply, 15 and making appellate review
difficult. 16
3. The Hybrid Approach
The Senate Judiciary Committee, in drafting the report in support
of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, could have
advocated either the subjective factors or the lodestar method of com-
puting fee awards. The Committee Report stated that the Johnson fac-
tors were appropriate standards to be used in computing reasonable
fee awards. " At the same time, the Report implicitly accepted the
lodestar approach by requiring compensation "for all time reasonably
expended on the matter."'" Indeed, in its 1983 decision in Hensley v.
Eckerhart, '9 the Supreme Court interpreted Congress' language to
require that the computation of the lodestar amount be the starting
point in determining a reasonable fee award,2 0 increased or decreased
by considering the Johnson factors not subsumed within the initial
lodestar computation.2  The approach which has emerged as the pre-
dominant method of computing fee awards combines the use of the
Johnson subjective factors and the lodestar approach.2
The Court more completely defined the hybrid approach to comput-
ing fee awards in Blum v. Stenson.2 3 The Court held that market-
based hourly rates, not rates based on the actual cost of providing legal
services in a particular case, should be used in setting the lodestar
amount.24 The Court also indicated that the lodestar amount is pre-
sumed to be a reasonable fee under the fee-shifting statutes.25 After
14. Lindy I 487 F.2d at 167; M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 7, at f 15.03[6]; Dobbs,
Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 DUKE L.J. 435, 465.
15. M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 7, at 15.03[6]; Dobbs, supra note 14, at 465-66.
16. Lindy , 487 F.2d at 166; M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 7, at " 15.03[6]; Dobbs,
supra note 14, at 466.
17. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 4, at 6.
18. Id. (quoting Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) C 9444 (C.D.
Cal. 1974)). The lodestar approach is designed to compensate for the time expended by the
attorney at market hourly rates. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
19. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
20. Id. at 433.
21. Id. at 434. The Court in Hensley did not state which Johnson factors are subsumed within
the initial lodestar computation, but did indicate that the "results obtained" was an important
factor which would justify adjustment of the original lodestar computation. Id.
22. M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 7, at 1; 15.03[4].
23. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
24. Id. at 895.
25. Id. at 897. Thus, according to the Court's decision in Blum, subjective factors such as the
quality of representation and the novelty and complexity of the issues are normally reflected in
the lodestar amount. Id. at 898-99. Contrary to the Court's conclusion in Hensley. the "results
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Blum, the Johnson factors can be considered in determining the rea-
sonable market-based hourly rate and reasonable number of hours
used to compute the lodestar amount.26 The lodestar amount can be
adjusted only when the Johnson factors are not reflected in the reason-
able number of hours and reasonable market-based hourly rates.
C. Bases for Adjusting Lodestar Fee Amounts
1. Quality of Representation
Courts traditionally increased or decreased lodestar fees based on
the unusually high or low quality of the attorney's representation. 7
Because this factor is normally reflected in the market-based hourly
rate, the Supreme Court held in Blum that an upward adjustment is
justified only when the quality of service rendered is superior to that
reasonably expected in light of the market-based hourly rates and the
success achieved in the litigation is "exceptional. ' z8  Based on the
Court's application of this test, 9 enhancements to the lodestar amount
based on quality of representation are rare.
2. Delay in Receiving Payment
The second basis for adjusting the lodestar amount is an enhance-
ment for the lawyer's delay in receiving payment of the attorney's
fee.30 Courts have awarded delay enhancements based on interest (the
obtained" factor is generally subsumed within the other Johnson factors, so that it should not
normally be used as an independent basis for enhancing an otherwise reasonable fee. Id. at 900.
26. The authors of one attorney's fee treatise have interpreted Blum as accepting the practice
of reflecting the Johnson subjective criteria in the determination of reasonable market-based
hourly rates. M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 7, at t 15.03[4]. On the other hand, another
commentator described the effect of Blum as "a firm position against the Johnson factors method
of fee calculation." Dobbs, supra note 14, at 469. Although Dobbs sees Blum as a rejection of
the Johnson approach, he also recognizes that subjective factors might be used to determine the
appropriate market hourly rate. Id. at 488. There is not, in a given market, one reasonable
hourly rate for an attorney's services. Rather, a variety of rates exists from which to choose. Id.
at 486-89; Blum, 465 U.S. at 899. Therefore, in applying the holding in Blum, a trial court judge
has some discretion to apply the Johnson factors in choosing a market-based hourly rate from the
range of possible hourly rates.
27. See, eg., Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272,
280-82 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 106 S. Ct. 3088 (1986), rev'd on other grounds
on rehearing, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Blum,
enhancements to lodestar amounts based on quality of representation were common. See, e.g.,
Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 893-94 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Lindy Bros. Builders., Inc. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117-18 (3d Cir. 1976).
28. Blum, 465 U.S. at 899.
29. Delaware Valley I, 106 S. Ct. at 3098; Blum, 465 U.S. at 899-902.
30. See, eg., Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1081 (4th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. University College,
706 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983); Copeland, 641 F.2d at 893.
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loss of the use of money)" and inflation (the loss of the earning power
of money).32 Many courts compensate for both the interest and infla-
tion aspects of delay by using current, as opposed to historic, market-
based hourly rates in computing the lodestar amount.3 3 The Supreme
Court has not explicitly accepted or rejected enhancements to lodestar
amounts based on delay.34
3. Contingency
The third basis for adjusting the lodestar amount is contingency,
defined as the lawyer's risk at the outset of the litigation that no fee
will be recovered. 35  Under the typical fee-shifting statutes, attorneys
can recover fees only if their clients are successful in the litigation.36
Consequently, attorneys deciding to take cases with clients under a
fee-shifting statute are risking nonpayment for the legal services ren-
dered. 37  The contingency enhancement is an attempt by courts to
compensate attorneys for taking such a risk.38 The enhancement has
31. Enhancement for interest is awarded because attorney's fees are received in contingency
cases only after the legal services are rendered, thereby depriving the attorney of the use of the
money in the meantime. Copeland, 641 F.2d at 893; Dobbs, supra note 14, at 475.
32. Copeland, 641 F.2d at 893; Dobbs, supra note 14, at 476-77.
33. Dobbs, supra note 14, at 476. See, e.g., Murray v. Weinberger, 741 F.2d 1423, 1433 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983). "Historic" market-based
hourly rates are the rates in effect when the services are rendered. "Current" market-based
hourly rates are the rates in effect when a court makes the fee award.
34. The Court has discussed delay enhancements in two recent cases. First, in Library of
Congress v. Shaw, 106 S. Ct. 2957 (1986), the Court disallowed the enhancement because it was
assessed against the United States in violation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See infra
notes 117-20 and accompanying text. The Court in Shaw did not base its decision on any
theoretical deficiency of awarding delay enhancements to lodestar amounts. Second, a majority
of the Justices in Delaware Valley II stated that "[w]e do not suggest ... that adjustments for
delay are inconsistent with the typical fee-shifting statute." Delaware Valley I1 107 S. Ct. 3078,
3082 (1987).
35. Although courts frequently use the terms interchangeably, compensation for
"contingency" is separate and distinct from "contingent fee arrangements" typically entered into
by attorneys and clients in civil litigation. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 903 (1984) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Copeland, 641 F.2d at 893. In contingent fee cases, the attorney receives an
agreed upon percentage of the recovery. The contingency adjustment under fee-shifting statutes
is an enhancement to the lodestar figure which is not based on a percentage of recovery. The two
concepts are related only in that they both involve the risk of not being paid.
36. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
37. When plaintiffs seek monetary damages, attorneys can mitigate the risk of nonpayment by
entering into contingent fee arrangements with their clients, even in cases where fees are
recoverable under a fee-shifting statute. See Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 328 (7th Cir. 1986)
(citing cases from United States courts of appeals which have considered the effect of contingent
fee arrangements on awards under fee-shifting statutes).
38. Blum, 465 U.S. at 903 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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traditionally been computed by assessing the prevailing party's likeli-
hood of success at the outset of the litigation.39
The issue of whether contingency enhancements are permitted was
expressly left open by the Court in Blum. I0 After Blum, most federal
courts continued to allow enhancements" to the lodestar amount based
on contingency.4"
II. PENNSYLVANIA v. DELAWARE VALLEY CITIZENS'
COUNCIL FOR CLEAN AIR (DELAWARE VALLEY II)
In Delaware Valley II, the Supreme Court determined that,
although contingency enhancements to lodestar fee amounts are per-
mitted under fee-shifting statutes, such an enhancement could not be
awarded based on the particular facts of the case.
A. History of the Litigation
In 1977, the Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air ("Citi-
zens' Council") instituted an action in federal district court to compel
Pennsylvania to undertake a vehicle emission inspection and mainte-
nance ("I/M") program as required by the federal Clean Air Act.4"
In 1978, Pennsylvania, pursuant to a consent decree, agreed to imple-
ment the I/M program. 3 Pennsylvania resisted compliance with the
terms of the consent decree for several years thereafter. 4 The Citi-
zens' Council accomplished the implementation of the I/M program
only following "protracted, bitter, and highly publicized enforcement
39. See Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
281, 326 (1977). Under the traditional "multiplier" approach, the lodestar amount is multiplied
by the reciprocal of the probability of success at the outset of the litigation to arrive at the
appropriate contingency enhancement. Id.
40. 465 U.S. at 901 n.17 ("We have no occasion in this case to consider whether the risk of
not being the prevailing party in a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 case, and therefore not being entitled to an
award of attorney's fees from one's adversary, may ever justify an upward fee adjustment.").
41. See Delaware Valley II, 107 S. Ct. 3078, 3095 n.6 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(listing cases from eleven of the thirteen United States courts of appeals which have continued to
allow contingency enhancements). Two courts of appeals have rejected contingency as an
independent basis for enhancing a fee award after Blum. See McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750
F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1984); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir., 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985).
42. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 581 F. Supp. 1412,
1416 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 106 S. Ct.
3088 (1986), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987).
43. Id. at 1416-17.
44. Id. at 1417-18.
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proceedings."45 After obtaining relief, the Citizens' Council petitioned
the district court for an award of attorney's fees under the Clean Air
Act.4
6
The district court computed the basic lodestar amount for each of
the various phases of the litigation, then doubled the basic lodestar
amount pertaining to two phases of the litigation and quadrupled it in
a third phase. 47 These enhancements were based on the contingent
nature of the case and the quality of the work performed.48 The Third
Circuit affirmed the district court's computation of fees,4 9 and Penn-
sylvania appealed the award to the Supreme Court.
In Delaware Valley I, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's
computation of the lodestar amount,5" but reversed its enhancement of
the lodestar for the quality of counsels' performance.5' The Court
concluded that, because the quality of representation is normally
reflected in the market-based hourly rate, and because neither the Citi-
zens' Council presented evidence nor the lower courts made findings
that the lodestar amount was unreasonable, the lodestar amount could
not be adjusted in this case based on quality of representation.52 The
Court deferred its decision concerning whether the lodestar amount
can be enhanced based on contingency until after counsel presented
additional arguments to the Court on the issue.53
B. The Three Opinions in Delaware Valley II
After rehearing arguments on the case, the Court was unable to
agree on a majority opinion. A bare majority of the Justices agreed
that the district court erred in augmenting the lodestar amount based
45. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272, 274 (3d
Cir. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 106 S. Ct. 3088 (1986), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing,
107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1982).
47. Delaware Valley, 581 F. Supp. at 1422-31. The district court had divided the case into
nine phases, with each phase relating to a different aspect of the litigation. Id. at 1420.
48. Id. at 1431. The trial court did not indicate how the multiplier amounts were computed,
but did state that a multiplier of two was applied "where [the] likelihood of success was least,"
and a multiplier of four was applied where "eventual implementation of the I/M program
seemed least likely and the phase where plaintiffs' work was superior." Id. The district court
adjusted the total attorney's fees from a $82,234 basic lodestar amount to $209,813 after
application of the risk/quality multipliers. Delaware Valley, 762 F.2d at 275.
49. Delaware Valley, 762 F.2d at 274-75.
50. Delaware Valley L 106 S. Ct. 3088, 3094 (1986).
51. Id. at 3099.
52. Id. at 3099-3100.
53. Id. at 3100.
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on contingency. 54 Justice White wrote a plurality opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia, stating that
Congress did not intend for contingency to be an independent basis for
increasing the amount of an otherwise reasonable lodestar fee. 6 Jus-
tice Blackmun wrote a dissent, 7 joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens. The dissenting opinion completely rejected the plural-
ity's analysis and found instead that Congress had intended to permit
contingency enhancements. 58  The dissenting Justices would have
remanded the case to the district court for consideration consistent
with its proposal for a new method of enhancement computation, a
"market" approach.5 9 After the trial court applied the "market"
approach, the dissenting Justices would have required it to determine
if any extra enhancement was appropriate "because of the significant
legal risks apparent at the outset of the litigation and because of the
importance of the case."6
Justice O'Connor, in a separate opinion,61 agreed with the plurality
that the contingency multiplier awarded should not have been allowed
in this case. 2 With the dissent, she argued that Congress intended to
permit contingency enhancements when computing a reasonable attor-
ney's fee under the fee-shifting statutes.63 While she found the dis-
sent's "market" approach theoretically superior to the traditional
practice of assessing the probability of success in a particular case,'
she was unable to determine from the dissenting opinion how the the-
ory could be objectively put into practice.65
54. Delaware Valley II, 107 S. Ct. 3078, 3089 (1987) (plurality opinion); id. at 3091
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
55. For purposes of this Note, Justice White's opinion in Delaware Valley II is referred to as
the "plurality opinion."
56. Delaware Valley I, 107 S. Ct. at 3086 (plurality opinion). The plurality concluded that
such enhancements should only be allowed in exceptional cases, and this was not such an
exceptional case. Id. at 3088.
57. For purposes of this Note, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Delaware Valley II is referred to
as the "dissenting opinion."
58. Delaware Valley I1 107 S. Ct. at 3092-94 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 3101-02. See also infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
60. Delaware Valley II 107 S. Ct. at 3102 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. For purposes of this Note, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Delaware Valley I1 is referred to
as the "concurring opinion."
62. Delaware Valley I1 107 S. Ct. at 3089 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 3090. Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality opinion that assessment of the
likelihood of success in a particular case is subject to severe criticisms. See infra notes 70-75 and
accompanying text.
65. Delaware Valley I1 107 S. Ct. at 3090 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
proposed the application of three standards to constrain a trial court's discretion in enhancing a
fee based on contingency. First, lower courts should be required to treat their determinations of
477
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C. The Significance of Delaware Valley II to Attorney's Fee
Computations
Four principles emerged from the opinions in Delaware Valley II
which serve as a guide to lower courts in computing awards under fee-
shifting statutes.
1. Contingency Enhancements Permitted
Five Justices (the four dissenting Justices and Justice O'Connor)
agreed that Congress intended to permit consideration of contingency
enhancements in enacting the fee-shifting statutes.6 6 Although the
statutes do not expressly provide for them, such enhancements are
allowed when necessary to carry out the purpose of the fee-shifting
statutes of encouraging private enforcement of statutory rights.67
2. Rejection of Traditional Contingency "Multiplier" Approach
Contingency multipliers have traditionally been computed by multi-
plying the lodestar amount by a factor based on the probability of suc-
cess at the outset of the litigation.6" All nine Justices rejected the
application of such contingency multipliers to lodestar fees.6 9
Justice White noted that the use of traditional contingency multipli-
ers is flawed for at least four reasons. First, estimating the prevailing
party's probability of success at the time the attorney first considered
how a particular market compensates for contingency as binding precedent in that market. Id.
Second, the fee applicant should bear the burden of proving how the relevant market
compensates for risk. Id. Third, courts should never award a contingency enhancement based
on an assessment of the risk of loss in a particular case. Id. at 3091. Because these standards
were not used by the district court in enhancing the fee, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
plurality that the allowance of a contingency enhancement should be reversed in this case. Id. at
3091.
66. Id. at 3089 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 3092-94 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
White's plurality opinion states that Congress did not intend to allow enhancements based on the
risk of losing the lawsuit. Id. at 3086 (plurality opinion). However, even after stating that
Congress did not intend to allow such enhancements, the plurality opinion allows an
enhancement for risk of nonpayment in "exceptional cases where the need and justification for
such enhancement are readily apparent and are supported by evidence in the record and specific
findings by the courts." Id. at 3088. Thus, even the plurality Justices leave open the possibility
of enhancing the lodestar amount based on risk of nonpayment.
67. Id. at 3093 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 3, at 1.
68. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
69. While the majority of Justices voted to reverse the district court's enhancement, the four
dissenting Justices also did not agree with the method used by the trial court to compute the
enhancements, and voted to remand the case for redetermination. Delaware Valley IA 107 S. Ct.
at 3102 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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filing the suit is extremely difficult.7" Such a probability cannot be
computed with mathematical precision and its computation requires
the use of hindsight by the judge. Second, a court's evaluation of con-
tingency creates a potential conflict of interest between the attorney
and client.71 The prevailing attorney is forced to expose the weak-
nesses and inconsistencies of the client's case in order to maximize the
fee award when the decision on substantive law may be appealed to a
higher court.72 Third, enhancing the fee based on probability of suc-
cess in a particular case both penalizes losing parties with the strongest
cases73 and subsidizes the prevailing party's attorney for bringing
other unsuccessful actions.74 Fourth, the probability of success cannot
be determined with certainty or accuracy. Thus, enhancement com-
puted on this basis is not likely to serve as an incentive for attorneys to
represent indigent plaintiffs and tends to make fee litigation protracted
and complicated.75
3. Acceptance of "Market" Approach to Computing Contingency
Enhancements
Justice O'Connor endorsed the four dissenting Justices' "market"
approach to computing contingency enhancements. 76 According to
70. Id. at 3084-85 (plurality opinion); Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee
Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 486 (1980).
71. Delaware Valley II, 107 S. Ct. at 3084 (plurality opinion); Leubsdorf, supra note 70, at
482-83.
72. Delaware Valley 1I, 107 S. Ct. at 3084 (plurality opinion); Leubsdorf, supra note 70, at
483. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1983) (a potential conflict of
interest exists "if the representation may be materially limited . . . by the lawyer's own
interests").
73. Delaware Valley II, 107 S. Ct. at 3085 (plurality opinion); Note, Promoting the
Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 375
(1980). As the prevailing party's probability of success decreases, the multiplier amount
increases under the traditional multiplier approach. Leubsdorf, supra note 70, at 488. This
result has been interpreted as violating the requirement that only prevailing parties are permitted
to recover awards under the fee-shifting statutes. Delaware Valley II, 107 S. Ct. at 3086;
McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1392 (7th Cir. 1984).
74. Delaware Valley II, 107 S. Ct. at 3085 (plurality opinion); Leubsdorf, supra note 70, at
489.
75. Delaware Valley 1, 107 S. Ct. at 3085 (plurality opinion); Leubsdorf, supra note 70, at
496; Comment, Nonpayment Risk Multipliers: Incentives or Windfalls?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1074,
1095 (1986).
76. Delaware Valley II, 107 S. Ct. at 3089 (O'Connor, L, concurring). The dissenting opinion
presents a five-step process for implementing its "market" approach. First, the trial court
determines whether the case was taken on a contingent basis. Second, the court determines
whether the attorneys were able to mitigate the risks of nonpayment. Third, it determines if
other economic risks, such as delay and size of the firm, were aggravated by the contingency.
Fourth, the court arrives at a contingency enhancement which compensates the attorneys for the
risks assumed. Fifth, the court determines whether an extra enhancement is warranted based on
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the dissenting opinion, once a court determines that the facts of a par-
ticular case justify a contingency enhancement, the proper amount of
the enhancement is that which "parallels, as closely as possible, the
premium for contingency that exists in prevailing market rates.""7
The "market" approach requires courts to base compensation for con-
tingency "on the difference in market treatment of contingent fee cases
as a class."78 Under the dissent's analysis, an enhancement based on
how the market compensates for contingency will not be subject to the
criticisms of the traditional contingency multiplier approach because
the "market" approach does not require an assessment of the riskiness
of a particular case. 79  However, neither the dissenting opinion8° nor
the concurring opinion offers a concrete method of computing the
enhancement and implementing the "market" approach.
4. Fee Applicant's Burden of Proof
Justice White's and Justice O'Connor's opinions imposed two bur-
den of proof requirements on fee applicants. First, in order to receive
a contingency enhancement, fee applicants must prove that without
risk enhancement they "would have faced substantial difficulties in
finding counsel in the local or other relevant market."'" Second, after
the court finds that a contingency enhancement is appropriate, the fee
applicant has the burden of establishing the amount of the contingency
enhancement.82 Under the "market" approach to computing the
enhancement, this requirement places the burden of proving the
degree to which the relevant market compensates for contingency on
the fee applicant.83
III. FEE ENHANCEMENTS AFTER DELAWARE VALLEY H
Although a majority of the Supreme Court agreed that contingency
enhancements are permitted under federal fee-shifting statutes, the
Court's decision in Delaware Valley II did not present a workable
the "significant legal risks apparent at the outset of the litigation and because of the importance
of the case." Delaware Valley I, 107 S. Ct. at 3102 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 3089 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 3090.
81. Id. at 3089 (plurality opinion); id. at 3091 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This test is based
on an economic assumption that a trial court's attorney's fee award should not exceed the
amount necessary to attract competent counsel. Id. at 3089 n.12; Lewis v. Coughlin, 801 F.2d
570, 576 (2d Cir. 1986).
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method of computing such enhancements. While a majority of the
Court proposed a "market" approach to computing contingency
enhancements, no actual market exists from which to compute the
enhancement. Based on the Court's adoption of strict burden of proof
requirements, many lower courts may conclude that contingency
enhancements have been effectively eliminated by the Delaware Valley
II decision. Nevertheless, methods of applying the decision do exist.
If lower courts fail to permit contingency enhancements in all but
exceptional circumstances, Congress should amend the fee-shifting
statutes to permit such enhancements so that the fee-shifting statutes
achieve the desired incentive effect.
A. Both the Purposes and Legislative History Behind Fee-Shifting
Statutes Require Contingency Enhancements
In order to achieve the incentive Congress intended in enacting the
fee-shifting statutes, fees must be awarded which are fully competitive
with the private market and which attract competent lawyers in pri-
vate practice to take public interest cases.8" Unless compensation
under fee-shifting statutes is complete, private attorneys will not take
public interest cases outside their limited pro bono practices.8 5 Fur-
thermore, public interest law firms will be forced to reject many statu-
tory enforcement cases.86
84. Delaware Valley II. 107 S. Ct. at 3094 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); The Committee on
Legal Assistance, Counsel Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 39 REc. A. B. CITY OF N.Y. 300,
317 (1984).
85. The House report in support of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 found that private lawyers were refusing
to take on civil cases because they could not afford to do so. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 3,
at 3. See also Amicus Curiae Brief of Twelve Small Private Civil Rights Law Firms in Support of
Respondents at 6-29, Delaware Valley II (No. 85-5).
The pro bono bar is extremely limited. See Gathercole, Legal Services and the Poor, in
LAWYERS AND THE CONSUMER INTEREST: REGULATING THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES
423 (1982). Although lawyers "should" do pro bono work in jurisdictions which have adopted
the American Bar Association's MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983), it
is unlikely that this will have a great impact on private attorneys' acceptance of public interest
cases, which often take many years and pit attorneys against state and federal governments. For
example, the action which is the subject of Delaware Valley II took seven years to complete.
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 581 F. Supp. 1412, 1416-18
(E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 106 S. Ct. 3088
(1986), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987).
86. Legal service organizations funded by the Legal Services Corporation are already
precluded by federal law from taking cases in which an award is available based on a fee-shifting
statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1) (1982). See also Note, Integration of the Legal Aid and Fee-
Shifting Exceptions to the American Rule: Proposal for Amending the Legal Services Corporation
Act, 5 REV. OF LITIGATION 157 (1986) (recommending that Congress amend the Legal Services
Corporation Act to allow legal aid representation in certain statutory fee cases).
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If attorneys must choose between litigating a case in which compen-
sation is regularly received as services are rendered and litigation
under a fee-shifting statute where compensation will be received only
at the end of the litigation, and then only if their client prevails, most
will choose the noncontingent employment unless two items are com-
pensated. First, the attorneys must know they will be compensated for
the delay in receiving payment for services rendered.8 7 Second, they
must know they will be compensated for assuming the risk of nonpay-
ment at the outset of the litigation.88 Enhancements for delay and
contingency ensure that adequate counsel will be attracted to public
interest litigation without granting windfalls to prevailing attorneys.89
The legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which the Court used in
analyzing the Clean Air Act fee-shifting provision in Delaware Valley
H, 90 buttresses the conclusion that Congress intended to allow contin-
gency enhancements. The Senate Report in support of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 cited three cases which properly applied the Johnson factors. 9'
In one of those cases, Stanford Daily v. Zurcher,9 2 the court specifi-
cally held that the lodestar amount should be increased "to reflect the
fact that the attorneys' compensation ... was contingent in nature."93
87. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
88. Id. at 892; Berger, supra note 39, at 324-25.
89. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 4, at 6. A properly computed contingency enhancement
will not result in a windfall to a prevailing attorney, since these items are not included in the
initial lodestar amount.
Justice White, in his plurality opinion in Delaware Valley IL argues that an enhancement for
contingency results in a windfall to the prevailing attorney. Delaware Valley I 107 S. Ct. at
3087 (plurality opinion). According to Justice White, contingency is taken into account in
computing the lodestar amount since factors such as "novelty and difficulty of the issues
presented" and "the potential for protracted litigation" are considered in computing the
reasonable number of hours and reasonable hourly rate. Id. This argument fails because
compensation for an attorney's acceptance of a risk of nonpayment at the outset of litigation is
entirely separate and distinct from compensation for overcoming difficulty and other subjective
characteristics of the case. The risk assumed by attorneys is that they will not be compensated
for any of the hours worked if their client loses. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Twelve Small
Private Civil Rights Law Firms in Support of Respondents at 40-41, Delaware Valley H (No. 85-
5).
90. See supra note 4.
91. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 4, at 6. The cases cited in the report are Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9444
(C.D. Cal. 1974). "These cases have resulted in fees which are adequate to attract competent
counsel, but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys." S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 4, at 6.
92. 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
93. Id. at 686. For an explanation of the difference between cases which are "contingent in
nature" and "contingent fee agreements," see supra note 35.
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The legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 therefore clearly shows that
Congress contemplated contingency enhancements in computing a
reasonable fee award.94
B. Criticism of Delaware Valley II
After having first concluded that contingency enhancements are
allowed in appropriate circumstances, the Court took steps to elimi-
nate all such enhancements from awards under fee-shifting statutes. It
is likely that many lower courts will interpret Delaware Valley II as
eliminating contingency enhancements in all but exceptional cases
based on both the difficulty in applying the Court's "market"
approach and the strict burden of proof requirements imposed on fee
applicants.
1. The "Market" Approach
Under the "market" approach to computing contingency enhance-
ments, adopted by the dissenting Justices and Justice O'Connor, it is
not necessary to determine the likelihood of success in particular
cases. 95 Rather, the proper method of enhancement is based on the
market's treatment of contingent cases as a class.9 6 In proposing that
trial courts arrive at market-based enhancements without assessing the
probability of success in particular cases, the dissenting opinion does
not suggest how such enhancements should be computed.
97
94. See Note, Attorney Fees and the Contingency Factor Under 42 US. C § 1988: Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984), 64 OR. L. REV. 571, 582 (1986); Comment, The Contingency
Factor & The Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976: Legislative History Requires Continued
Application, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 193, 213-14 (1986).
In his plurality opinion, Justice White found the legislative history to be inconclusive on the
issue of whether Congress intended to allow contingency enhancements. Delaware Valley II, 107
S. Ct. 3078, 3086 (1987) (plurality opinion). He found a divergence in both the analysis and
result in the three cases cited in the Senate Report which properly applied the Johnson factors.
Id. However, the holdings in Davis and Swann are not inconsistent with the holdings in Stanford
Daily. In Davis, the court allowed an enhancement based on the excellent results achieved and
the difficulty of the issue, but it did not consider a contingency enhancement at all. Davis, 8
Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 19444. In Swann, the court actually reduced a plaintiff's request for
fees based on the application of nine subjective factors similar to those stated in Johnson, but no
contingency enhancement was considered or apparently requested. Swann, 66 F.R.D. at 484-86.
Stanford Daily is the only case of the three cited in the Senate Report which considers
contingency enhancements, so its result and analysis are not inconsistent with the results and
analyses in Davis and Swann.
95. Delaware Valley II, 107 S. Ct. at 3097 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 3089 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. The dissent's market approach is based on the analysis of the American Bar Association's
Amicus Curiae brief, which also does not explain how to put the "market" theory into practice.
Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, Delaware Valley II (No. 85-5).
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Any such computation should presumably be based on assessments
of actual markets for contingent cases as a class. However, because no
market exists from which to compute such enhancements,98 methods
of applying the "market" approach based on actual markets for con-
tingent cases as a class likewise cannot exist. Unlike hourly rates
which are readily identifiable in a particular market, compensation for
contingency in cases subject to fee-shifting statutes has no basis in the
marketplace. Any method of applying the dissent's "market"
approach must therefore be based on hypothetical markets for contin-
gent cases as a class.9 9 Many lower courts are likely to conclude that
they cannot award contingency enhancements based on hypothetical
markets.
2. Burden of Proof Requirements
The Court's adoption of two onerous burden of proof requirements
for parties seeking enhancements based on contingency further
impairs the prevailing attorney's ability to recover contingency
enhancements.
a. Burden To Show Substantial Difficulty in Locating Counsel
First, in order to be eligible for a contingency enhancement, fee
applicants must prove that they "faced substantial difficulties in find-
ing counsel in the local or other relevant market."'" The apparent
rationale for this test is that if the relevant market has a sufficient sup-
ply of competent attorneys accepting cases for which only a basic lode-
star fee award is available, the award is large enough without a
contingency enhancement. 10 1
The fee applicant's burden to prove substantial difficulties in finding
counsel requires a hindsight evaluation by a judge applying terms
which are not defined in the Court's opinions. The Court offers no
guidance on how many other attorneys must be consulted in order for
98. Dobbs, supra note 14, at 475.
99. One court, in the wake of the Delaware Valley II decision, has attempted to guide the
district court in formulating a method of enhancing the market-based hourly rate to reflect
"market" contingency. See Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 380-82 (3d Cir. 1987).
According to this court, the enhancement "might have to be based on an econometric model that
determined the mathematical relationship between hourly rate and contingency." Id. at 380. The
Third Circuit panel was searching for a method of determining how the actual market
compensates for contingency. However, a mathematical relationship between hourly rates and
contingency is not likely to be found because contingency is not normally reflected in market-
based hourly rates. See Dobbs, supra note 14, at 475.
100. Delaware Valley II, 107 S. Ct. at 3089 (plurality opinion).
101. Id.
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the difficulties to be considered "substantial," and does not explain the
qualifications an attorney must meet to be considered "competent."
Therefore, the Court's test allows a court to conclude, based on ambig-
uous and undefined terms, that contingency enhancements are not
allowed in virtually every case.1" 2
It appears that the only way a fee applicant can meet the burden
imposed by the test is to produce evidence that the client visited and
was rejected by other counsel. However, reliable written documenta-
tion that such rejections occurred is unlikely to be available from a
client.'0 3 The existence of substantial difficulties in finding counsel
may be a relevant factor indicating that enhancement is required in
order to attract competent counsel. But requiring an attorney to prove
such difficulties in order to receive compensation for contingency con-
travenes Congress' purpose in enacting the fee-shifting statutes. By
focusing on actions taken by clients rather than on the actions of attor-
neys which justify a fully compensatory fee award, this threshold test
is not appropriate in applying statutes designed to provide an incentive
for the private enforcement of Congressional policy.
b. Burden To Show How Market Compensates for Contingency
The second burden which the fee applicant must meet is to prove
"the degree to which the relevant market compensates for contin-
gency."'" Justice O'Connor, who specifically adopted this require-
ment in adopting the dissent's "market" approach, does not indicate
how this burden can be met. Proving how a particular relevant mar-
ket actually compensates for contingency will be extremely difficult
because no market exists from which to determine how contingency in
fee-shifting cases is compensated.10 5
102. Of course, the same ambiguous terms might also be interpreted by judges to allow
contingency enhancements in every case. However, rejection of contingency enhancements is the
more likely result. One court has already relied on the "substantial difficulties" test to deny
recovery of a contingency enhancement. See Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1404-05 (4th Cir.
1987).
103. The Court's test will encourage attorneys and clients to take artificial actions which
Congress could not have intended. In order to be sure that a contingency adjustment would be
available, an attorney desiring to take a case for which an attorney's fee award could be available
will have to assemble evidence that the client shopped for and had difficulty retaining a lawyer to
take the case. Thus, the attorney will have an incentive to ask a potential client to visit other
attorneys with the sole purpose of being rejected because the risk of not being paid is too great.
In actions requesting injunctive relief, such an incentive could result in artificial delays
detrimental to the client's interests. Such a result flies in the face of Congress' intent in enacting
fee-shifting provisions for the expeditious enforcement of remedial legislation.
104. Delaware Valley 1. 107 S. Ct. at 3090 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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C. Implementation of Delaware Valley II by the Courts
Lower courts need not interpret Delaware Valley II as requiring
enhancement computations based on actual market compensation for
contingency. Instead, courts can achieve the incentive effect intended
by Congress by awarding enhancements for contingency tied to
enhancements for delay.
1. Compensation for Delay
After computing the lodestar amount, courts should award
enhancements for delay in all appropriate cases.' 0 6  The proper
method of computing the delay enhancement is to award interest on
lodestar amounts. This amount can be computed using historic mar-
ket-based hourly rates, the hourly rates in effect at the time the ser-
vices were rendered. 107 The use of market interest rates in effect over
the period the attorney's services were performed compensates for
both the inflation and interest elements of the delay enhancement.'0 8
The analysis can be simplified by computing the historic rate lodestar
amounts for each year of the litigation and compounding interest on
an annual basis using the actual market interest rate for each
period. 109
For example, an attorney might agree to represent a client and
receive compensation solely by virtue of a fee-shifting statute. On the
last day of the litigation, after three full years, the court awards lode-
star fees of $5000 per year, or $15,000 total. The court could assume
106. The question of the allowance of delay enhancements was expressly left open by five
Justices in Delaware Valley IL Delaware Valley I1, 107 S. Ct. at 3082 (plurality opinion). See
supra note 34.
107. Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1081 (4th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. University College, 706
F.2d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983).
108. Market interest rates include a component for anticipated inflation. Ohio-Sealy Mattress
Mfg. v. Scaly Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 663 n.17 (7th Cir. 1985); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 608-09
(10th ed. 1976).
109. The award of a delay enhancement based on interest charges to historic rates has been
criticized because it requires judges to determine the time when billing would have taken place.
Dobbs, supra note 14, at 476-77. Judges need not have difficulty making such a determination.
First, billing periods can be established. For example, total fees for each year can be considered
billed on the last day of the year for purposes of the interest computation. Second, the court can
place the burden on the fee applicant to present the billing records and interest computations for
review by the judge. With the use of computers, changes in historic rates during the fee
determination process can be reflected in the interest computation without difficulty.
Compounding has historically not been allowed in the computation of prejudgment interest.
See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 164 (1973). This rule has been applied to interest enhancements to
lodestar fees. See Gabriele v. Southworth, 712 F.2d 1505, 1508 11.1 (Ist Cir. 1983). There is no
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the fees would have been billed at the end of each year of the litigation.
If the average market interest rate was six percent the first year, eight
percent the second year, and ten percent the third year, the fee
enhancement based on the delay in receiving payment is $1440.110 An
enhancement based on delay is only appropriate to the extent the pre-
vailing attorney does not receive payments of the lodestar amount dur-
ing the course of the litigation."'
Many courts simplify the task of awarding delay enhancements by
computing the lodestar amount using current market-based hourly
rates, the hourly rates in effect at the time of the fee determination. 1 2
The use of current hourly rates is an inaccurate method of computing
the lodestar amount.113 Current hourly rates reflect increases from the
historical rates based, in part, on the lawyer's increased skill and expe-
rience.'14 Also, billing rates may grow at a rate different from the rate
of inflation. 5 Because historic market-based hourly rates are the
rates prevailing when the services are performed, they are a more
accurate measure of the attorney's fees incurred.'1 6 Courts can there-
fore accurately compute enhancements for delay in receiving payment
by using historic market-based hourly rates adjusted based on market
rates of interest.
Although enhancements for delay are required in all appropriate
cases in order to achieve a complete attorney's fee award, such
enhancements are not available if the losing party is the United States
or one of the fifty states. In Library of Congress v. Shaw, 11T the
Supreme Court held that, based on the doctrine of sovereign immu-
110. The enhancement is computed as follows:
Year one: no enhancement, since the fee is assumed to have been billed on the last day of the
year.
Year two: $5000 X 8% = $400.
Year three: ($5000 + $400 + $5000) X 10% = $1040.
The $5000 received on the last day of the litigation is not subject to a delay enhancement.
Thus, the total enhancement is $1440 ($400 + $1040).
I11. If fees are received during the course of the litigation, an enhancement for inflation is
appropriate only to compensate for the prevailing party's loss of earning power on the money
received at the end of the litigation. Ohio-Sealy, 776 F.2d at 663-64.
112. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. If current hourly rates are used, additional
enhancements based on delay are not appropriate because such rates presumably already include
enhancements for interest and inflation. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir.
1983).
113. See, e.g., New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1152-53 (2d
Cir. 1983).
114. Dobbs, supra note 14, at-477 n.263.
115. New York Ass'n, 711 F.2d at 1153.
116. United States v. Washington, 626 F. Supp. 1405, 1520 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
117. 106 S. Ct. 2957 (1986). Fees were awarded in Shaw based on Civil Rights Act § 706(k),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982) ("In any action or proceeding under this subehapter the court, in
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nity, an enhancement to a lodestar attorney's fee award for delay
could not be recovered against the United States. 1 8 The Court con-
cluded that, in providing for an award of costs, including reasonable
attorney's fees, to the prevailing party, Congress did not expressly
waive the government's immunity from paying interest." 9 According
to the Court, because enhancement for delay is equivalent to an award
of prejudgment interest, no enhancement for delay is available against
the United States.' 20
States enjoy sovereign immunity based on the Eleventh Amendment
of the United States Constitution. 12 ' Therefore, it is unlikely that
delay enhancements can be recovered from them absent an express
legislative waiver of immunity.
122
The Court's allowance of immunity for federal and state govern-
ments from enhancements for delay contravenes the purpose of the
fee-shifting statutes. Without compensation for delay, the incentive
for lawyers to take cases in which a state or federal government is the
defendant is incomplete. Congress intended that prevailing parties
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs,
and the . . .United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.").
118. The Court's argument was that, absent Congress' consent, the United States is immune
from suit. Sha, 106 S. Ct. at 2962 (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941)).
Based on this sovereign immunity, the rule emerged that "interest cannot be recovered unless the
award of interest was affirmatively and separately contemplated by Congress." Shaw, 106 S. Ct.
at 2962.
119. Id. at 2965.
120. Id. In addition, the Court stated that a statute which awards costs, including reasonable
attorney's fees, does not waive immunity for prejudgment interest, which is considered damages.
Id.
Following the decision in Shaw, lower courts are refusing to allow the use of current market-
based hourly rates in computing the lodestar amount when fees are assessed against the United
States. Such rates include an enhancement for delay, which the courts consider a violation of the
sovereign immunity doctrine. See Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 43,
50, reh g granted, 830 F.2d 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Young v. Pierce, 822 F.2d 1376, 1380 (5th Cir.
1987).
121. The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to grant the individual states immunity from an award of damages or retroactive
relief in actions based on federal law. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See also
Comment, Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1875 (1975).
Congress has the power to set aside this immunity, and such a power was exercised in awarding
costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, under federal fee-shifting statutes. Hutto v. Finney.
437 U.S. 678, 693-95 (1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). However, by
analogy to the Court's holding in Shaw, Congress did not waive the states' immunity from
interest on fee awards in enacting the fee-shifting statutes.
122. See Rogers v. Okin, 821 F.2d 22, 26-28 (lst Cir. 1987), cert. denied. 108 S. Ct. 709
(1988); contra Jenkins v. Missouri, Nos. 87-2075, 87-2076, 87-2077 (8th Cir. Jan. 29. 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP file) (finding the sovereign immunity doctrine and the holding
in Shaw to be inapplicable when delay is considered as one factor in setting the reasonable
market-based hourly rate in an attorney's fee award against a state).
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recover reasonable attorney's fees regardless of the status of the losing
party. Nevertheless, enhancements for delay are allowed after Shaw in
awards from private parties.123
2. Contingency Enhancements Tied to Delay Enhancements
One possible method of applying the dissent's "market" approach to
computing contingency enhancements is to increase the interest rate
used to compute a proper enhancement for delay to reflect the fact
that a person investing in a risky venture requires a higher than nor-
mal rate of return. 12 4 For example, in the delay example discussed
above,125 if the court doubled the relevant market interest rates to
account for both delay and contingency together, the total enhance-
ment to the $15,000 lodestar fee would be $2960. 126 The effect of this
computation is to award prevailing attorneys interest on the lodestar
amount from the time services were performed, based on higher than
normal market interest rates, in order to account for both their delay
in receiving payment and their assumption of the risk of
nonpayment. 127
This approach is designed to base compensation for contingency on
the difference in market treatment of contingent cases subject to fee-
shifting statutes "as a class." 128 Such a method, however, would ini-
tially require the use of interest rates which have no actual basis in the
marketplace. 129 Many lower courts are likely to conclude that any
enhancement based on hypothetical markets cannot be "objective and
123. Bebchick v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 805 F.2d 396, 409 n.34 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (Shaw does not apply to a case "which does not involve the Government or the
doctrine of sovereign immunity...").
124. Delay and contingency are related concepts. See, e.g., Delaware Valley II, 107 S. Ct.
3078, 3099 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Delay in payment causes cash-flow problems and
deprives an attorney of the use of money, thus magnifying the economic risk associated with the
uncertainty of payment").
125. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
126. The enhancement is computed as follows:
Year one: no enhancement because the fee is assumed to have been billed on the last day of the
year.
Year two: $5000 X 16% = $800.
Year three: ($5000 + $800 + $5000) X 20% = $2160.
The total enhancement is $2960 ($800 + $2160). The delay enhancement is $1440. See supra
note 110. The contingency enhancement is $1520.
127. An enhancement for contingency would be awarded only to the extent the prevailing
attorney actually assumed a risk of nonpayment. To the extent the attorney was able to mitigate
the risks of nonpayment, no contingency enhancement would be allowed. See Delaware Valley I1,
107 S. Ct. at 3102 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
489
Washington Law Review
nonarbitrary" as required by Justice O'Connor in Delaware Valley
J11130
Because five Justices agreed that contingency enhancements are per-
mitted under fee-shifting statutes, lower courts should not interpret
the decision in Delaware Valley II as effectively eliminating such
enhancements. In the approach to compensating contingency based
on delay enhancements, although the enhancement to interest rates in
a particular market may not be objectively determinable by reference
to an actual market, courts can derive an initial computation of the
enhancement by reference to some hypothetical market.13' Once a
court establishes an enhancement amount, that amount controls
future cases in the same market unless the fee applicant makes an
affirmative showing that the market for public interest lawyers
requires larger contingency enhancements.' 32 In this way, a market for
use in computing contingency enhancements will evolve over time.
Combining delay and contingency enhancement computations
would have significant benefits. Because of the presumption that a
court's prior interest rate enhancement is the proper amount in a par-
ticular market, the computation of the contingency enhancement
would be predictable. The difficulties inherent in the "multiplier"
approach would largely disappear because courts would not assess the
riskiness of particular cases. 133 And a significant incentive would be
created to prevent a defendant from delaying litigation.' 34
130. Delaware Valley 11, 107 S. Ct. at 3090 (O'Connor, J., concurring). By both accepting the
dissent's "market" approach and requiring objective computations when no actual market for
contingent cases exists, Justice O'Connor's analysis is fundamentally inconsistent. Under such
an interpretation of Delaware Valley I, a fee applicant may never be able to sustain the burden of
proving how the relevant market compensates for contingency.
131. The initial interest rate used by a court to apply the contingency enhancement in a
particular market can be determined in a number of ways. For example, the rate might be based
on an analogous "risky" interest rate existing in the relevant market, or on empirical studies
which determine the interest rate adjustment necessary to make lawyers indifferent between
contingent and noncontingent employment.
The initial computation of the market enhancement for contingency, and any subsequent
modifications to that computation, must not be based on case-specific subjective factors such as
"novelty and difficulty of the issues presented" and "the potential for protracted litigation."
Delaware Valley 11, 107 S. Ct. at 3087 (plurality opinion): id. at 3089 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 3090 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
134. However, because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a recovery of contingency
enhancements based on the computation of delay enhancements would not be available against
the federal and state governments. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
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D. Amendments to Fee-Shifting Statutes
If lower courts refuse to award contingency enhancements based on
the Delaware Valley II decision, Congress should amend fee-shifting
statutes to provide specifically for the computation of contingency
enhancements. A fee computed under the lodestar approach does not
fully compensate the prevailing attorney because it does not compen-
sate for delay and the risk of nonpayment. 135 The incentive for attor-
neys to take public interest cases that Congress was attempting to
create in the private sector will be incomplete without contingency
enhancements. In amending fee-shifting statutes, Congress should
consider adopting specific computation methods to provide guidance
to the courts.
Congress should also allow the application of delay enhancements
against all losing parties by amending fee-shifting statutes to waive the
sovereign immunity from interest of federal and state governments.
The abolition of sovereign immunity from interest in the attorney fee.
context would be consistent with the purpose of the fee-shifting stat-
utes of providing a complete incentive for the private enforcement of
Congressional policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order for Congress to achieve the intended incentive effect of fee-
shifting statutes, prevailing attorneys must be able to recover a full and
complete attorney's fee award. Such a recovery must include enhance-
ments to the lodestar amount based on delay and contingency in all
appropriate cases. In Delaware Valley 11, the Supreme Court failed to
adopt clear and complete guidelines to the lower courts in awarding
contingency enhancements and imposed strict burden of proof require-
ments on fee applicants. This Note proposes a method of compensat-
ing contingency based on delay enhancements, which is consistent
with the approach approved by a majority of the Justices in Delaware
Valley I1
Congress has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that its statutory
intent is carried out and to respond to judicial decisions which run
counter to its desires. If the result of the Court's decision in Delaware
Valley 11 is to eliminate contingency enhancements, Congress must
recognize the importance of fee-shifting statutes to the enforcement of
135. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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its policies and amend those statutes to provide the appropriate incen-
tives for attorneys to accept and pursue public interest cases.
Arthur J. Lachman
